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Abstract
To systematically examine the role of anticipatory skin conductance responses (aSCRs) in predicting Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
performance. Secondly, to assess the quality of aSCR evidence for the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) during the IGT.
Finally, to evaluate the reliability of current psychophysiological measurements on the IGT. Electronic databases, journals and
reference lists were examined for inclusion. Data were extracted by two reviewers and validated by another reviewer, using a
standardised extraction sheet along with a quality assessment. Two meta-analyses of aSCR measures were conducted to test the
relationship between overall aSCR and IGT performance, and differences in aSCR between advantageous and disadvantageous
decks. Twenty studies were included in this review. Quality assessment revealed that five studies did not measure anticipatory
responses, and few stated they followed standard IGT and/or psychophysiological procedures. The first meta-analysis of 15
studies revealed a significant, small-to-medium relationship between aSCR and IGT performance (r= .22). The second meta-
analysis of eight studies revealed a significant, small difference in aSCR between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks
(r= .10); however, publication bias is likely to be an issue. Meta-analyses revealed aSCR evidence supporting the SMH.
However, inconsistencies in the IGT and psychophysiological methods, along with publication bias, cast doubt on these effects.
It is recommended that future tests of the SMH use a range of psychophysiological measures, a standardised IGT protocol, and
discriminate between advantageous and disadvantageous decks.
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Introduction
Learning and decision making in uncertain or ambiguous sit-
uations is an important feature of everyday life. Even simple
decisions have a potentially perplexing array of options that
need to be evaluated to make an optimal choice. Blanchette
and Richards (2010) argue that the decision-making process
involves several stages: extracting meaning from ambiguous
information in order to construct a mental representation (in-
terpretation process); evaluating the evidence, estimating the
value and likelihood of the occurrence of differing outcomes
(judgement); and finally, drawing inferences and selecting
from the available options (choice). Among the most impor-
tant questions in this field is how emotion shapes different
forms of decision making (Quartz, 2009). Often emotion
was seen as a disruptive factor (Reimann & Bechara, 2010);
however, since Damasio’s (1994) ground-breaking Somatic
Marker Hypothesis (SMH), emotion has been viewed as
playing a significant role in the judgement of value that drives
decisions. The theory postulates that the foundation of optimal
decision making rests on the positive or negative emotional
reactions to previous outcomes of choices, rather than rational,
cognitive calculation of gains and losses. It is assumed that
these emotional reactions guide decision making by creating
positive or negative somatic markers (Bechara, Damasio, &
Damasio, 2000). According to Damasio (1994), in situations
of ambiguity and uncertainty, these somatic markers create an
emotional signal about the “goodness” or “badness” of
choices. Only those options that are marked as good are then
considered for selection. Thus, it is assumed that somatic
markers pre-empt or guide cognitive, reason-based choice.
A strength of the SMH rests on the specification of its
neural architecture. Damasio (1994) argued that somatic states
can be generated from primary (the "Body Loop") and sec-
ondary (the "As-if Body Loop") inducers. Primary inducers
are innate or learned stimuli that induce unpleasant or
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pleasurable states. They usually elicit an automatic response
through the amygdala. For instance, seeing a snake would
trigger a critical substrate in the neural system connected to
the amygdala and induce an obligatory fight or flight re-
sponse. Conversely, secondary inducers of somatic states are
generated by thoughts and memories of a hypothetical state
(i.e. a memory of seeing a snake). The recalled memory also
induces automatic, involuntary responses, but contrary to the
primary inducers, the responses are generated through the me-
dial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), amygdala, insular cortex, so-
matosensory cortex, brainstem nuclei and the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMpfc) (Bechara, 2001). A number of brain
imaging studies provided contrasting evidence in support of
the SMH (e.g. Heims, Critchley, Dolan, Mathias, & Cipolotti,
2004; Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, & Phillips, 2008;
Wilder, Weinberger, & Goldberg, 1998) providing evidence
for the MPFC, dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and
insula involvement during IGT performance; however, not
from the proposed main “loops” suggested within the SMH
(e.g. Bechara, 2001). Nevertheless, the aforementioned brain
imagining studies did not include other brain regions associ-
ated with learning probabilities in uncertain conditions (e.g.
Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005; Lin, Chiu, Cheng, &
Hsieh, 2008), thus focusing only on the VMpfc systems in
relation to IGT performance.
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is often used as an exper-
imental tool for assessing the SMH (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson 1994). It is argued that the IGT resem-
bles real-life decision making and is characterized by the un-
certainty of punishment and reward schedules (Bechara et al.,
2000). During the IGT, participants choose between four
decks of cards with different frequencies of gains and losses,
and learn to select from advantageous decks. Research evi-
dence from patients with lesions of limbic structures, neuro-
logical diseases or psychological disorders has emphasized
the importance of emotional processes in deciding advanta-
geously during IGT performance (e.g. Bechara, 2004;
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Fellows &
Farah, 2005; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & van den
Brink, 2005). It is postulated that somatic markers develop
through implicit learning, which marks the decks with a neg-
ative or positive valence, depending on the outcome of previ-
ous choices. These somatic markers inform explicit knowl-
edge and facilitate learning of deck contingencies (Bechara,
2004). Thus, emotions can be beneficial to decision making
when they are integral to the task. Importantly, studies of
clinical populations with damage to the prefrontal cortex re-
vealed that the absence of anticipatory makers are associated
with poor performance on IGT (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara
et al., 1999).
Consistent with the SMH proposals, evidence from clinical
studies focused on lesions to the VMpfc and bilateral damage
to amygdala shows that an absence of physiological activity
and the failure to develop somatic markers impairs decision
making (e.g. Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio,
& Damasio, 1996; Bechara, et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 2000;
Tranel, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). The original
papers reported that absence of anticipatory skin conductance
responses (aSCRs) are associated with poor IGT performance
in patients with lesions to the VMpfc (Bechara et al., 1994,
1996). The patients with VMpfc damage did not generate
aSCRs prior to selecting from disadvantageous decks, while
healthy controls did (Bechara et al., 1994, 1996, 1997). This
provides support for the SMH framework that the absence of
aSCRS (somatic markers) leads to poor learning, and conse-
quently poor performance on the IGT. Consistent with these
results, patients with damage to the amygdala exhibit a similar
behaviour pattern and inability to develop somatic markers for
disadvantageous options on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1999).
Thus, clinical studies have shown patients to have no or very
little aSCR activity, while healthy controls demonstrate aSCR
activity that is associated with good IGT performance. The
SMH is thus predicated on healthy participants exhibiting
aSCRs whenever a somatic marker is expected be present –
a failure to demonstrate this effect on a task devised to test the
SMH would be a fundamental challenge to the theory.
Studies that measure psychophysiological data have, to
some extent, provided evidence of elevated aSCRs to disad-
vantageous decks (e.g. Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara &
Damasio, 2002). The results also indicated that aSCR may
be reliable in predicting IGT performance. However, Suzuki,
Hirota, Takasawa, and Shigemasu (2003) argued that the SCR
to feedback (post-selection) is more influential on IGT perfor-
mance than aSCR. Their results suggest that the SCR to feed-
back is more important to IGT performance than SCR but less
so when contingencies have been learned. They found no
relationship between aSCRs and overall performance. In con-
trast to Suzuki et al. (2003), Carter and Smith-Pasqualini
(2004) related strong anticipatory somatic markers to optimal
decision making and faster learning. No correlation between
the SCR to feedback and optimal performance was found. The
results of these studies indicate that aSCRs are associated with
optimal performance on IGT; however, the direction of this
association is unclear. Furthermore, Tomb, Hauser, Deldin,
and Caramazza (2002) demonstrated the importance of elevat-
ed aSCRs to advantageous deck selection, and, thus, both
positive and negative feedback contribute to subsequent per-
formance. These data show that somatic markers may serve to
record long-term negative and positive consequences of a cer-
tain choice option.
Crone, Somsen, Van Beek, and Van Der Molen (2004)
made a similar suggestion in a study that investigated the
pattern of aSCR and heart-rate variability (HRV) on an ana-
logue of the IGT. In three groups of participants, split between
bad, good and moderate performance, they found the effect of
slow HRVand high aSCRs on disadvantageous deck selection
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compared to advantageous decks selection for the good per-
formance group. This was not found in the bad and moderate
groups. Furthermore, larger HRVand aSCRs were observed in
post-feedback (after the card is chosen) related to frequent
punishment from disadvantageous decks. This indicates that
deck selection rests on a positively or negatively valanced
somatic marker where a bad option reflects a negative state
that signals avoidance. Thus, careful examination of the
timing and range of psychophysiological measurements of
somatic markers is warranted.
The SMH continues to provoke debate among cognitive
scientists, with more than 800 papers considering this theory
and associated tasks published in 2017 (see Chiu, Huang,
Duann, & Lin, 2018, for review). Thus, the IGT continues to
be an important task for the study of emotional decision mak-
ing. According to the SMH, the search for somatic markers
involves identification of bodily responses that temporally
precede cognitive representations of logically organized ideas.
Since the basic premises of the SMH rest on the aSCR evi-
dence from a clinical population it is necessary to continue
investigation with regards to some of the unresolved issues
related to IGT performance of a healthy population. A specific
point in question is whether somatic markers inform higher
order processing and whether aSCRs inform IGT performance
by providing somatic markers in healthy participants. For ex-
ample, early research revealed that somatic signals are gener-
ated through an implicit involuntary process, which cannot be
verbalized, and precede explicit awareness (Bechara,
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio 2005). Further evidence, how-
ever, indicated that IGT performance in healthy participants is
determined by an interplay between ‘high-level reasoning’
(e.g. cost-benefit analysis) and somatic markers (Schiebener,
Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand, 2011), whereby analytic cogni-
tion plays a more salient role than traditionally acknowledged
(e.g. Simonovic, Stupple, Gale, & Sheffield, 2017a, 2017b).
While there is broad consensus that an aSCR effect is evident
on the IGT, it is the interpretation and timing of these re-
sponses that is debatable.
Issues with the timing and the interpretation of psycho-
physiological data are highlighted by Dunn, Dagleish, and
Lawrence’s (2006) review. They argued that although the
SMH is an elegant account of how emotion influences deci-
sion making, it lacks sufficient corroborating evidence. There
is evidence that anticipatory markers correlate with successful
performance on the task (e.g. Carter & Smith-Pasqualini,
2004), and that aSCR is elevated for disadvantageous decks
compared to advantageous decks (e.g. Bechara & Damasio,
2002; Crone et al., 2004). However, replication of key aSCR
findings on the IGT in healthy participants is lacking. Hence,
despite the wealth of literature utilising the IGT as a clinical
tool, the interpretation of psychophysiological results and IGT
data is complex and not without criticism. The current review
systematically examines two hypotheses related to
psychophysiological evidence of aSCR and IGT performance
in healthy individuals using Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA; Moher
et al., 2009). Firstly, that the strength of aSCR correlates with
successful IGT performance (Hypothesis 1); and secondly,
that there are differences in aSCR for disadvantageous and
advantageous decks such that aSCR is elevated for disadvan-
tageous decks compared to advantageous decks (Hypothesis
2). Finally, the review aims to assess the quality of articles
measuring aSCR during the IGT.
Methods
Search protocol and inclusion/exclusion criteria
Extensive searches of the following psychology databases
were conducted to pinpoint research studies for inclusion:
PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, Business Source Premier,
CINAHL Plus, MEDLINE and Web of Science. The content
lists of the following key journals were also reviewed:
Cognition and Emotion; Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral
Science; Psychophysiology; International Journal of
Psychophysiology; Journal of Psychophysiology and
Frontiers in Psychology. Additionally, reference lists of in-
cluded studies were examined for additional studies. Key au-
thors were contacted to obtain details of relevant unpublished
studies to reduce publication bias. Key terms (‘Somatic
Marker Hypothesis’, ‘SMH’, ‘Emotional Based Learning’,
‘EBL’) were combined with terms related to psychophysio-
logical measurements (‘Psychophysiological Response’,
‘Skin Conductance Response’, ‘SCR’, ‘Skin Resistance’,
‘SR’, ‘Autonomic Response’, ‘Heart Rate’, ‘HR’, ‘Heart
Rate Variability’, ‘Galvanic Skin Response’, ‘GSR’,
‘Electrodermal Activity’, ‘EDA’) and the behavioural task
(‘Iowa Gambling Task’, ‘IGT’) with a standardized protocol
using Boolean rules to identify relevant literature. Searches
were limited to healthy human participants.
English language studies that included psychophysiologi-
cal measurements with IGT performance where included.
Papers were excluded if they used clinical participants, if they
did not use psychophysiological measurements or if they
modified IGT to such an extent where the important properties
of the IGT were not maintained (e.g. frequencies of reward
and punishments on four decks). Electronic database searches
yielded 3,999 (IGT), 244 (SMH) and 20,046 (psychophysiol-
ogy measurements) results. These results were then combined
generating 84 study titles that were then filtered through the
search process summarized in Fig. 1. Forty-three studies were
initially included for review. Thirty-three were excluded be-
cause they: had not included psychophysiological measure-
ments (N=25); had used a clinical sample (N=1); had not used
the IGT (N=2); had not retained key features of the IGT
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(N=4); or had used a different methodology (N=1). Four stud-
ies were identified from the reference lists of included studies.
Our extensive search of aforementioned databases was under-
taken in June 2015 followed by additional search in January
2019 where we identified two additional studies that were
added to the corpus of studies.1 In total, 20 studies were in-
cluded in the review.
Quality assessment
Quality criteria were developed to assess the quality of all in-
cluded studies to account for potential biases that could result
from combining studies of different methodologies used, which
might lead to a misleading conclusion. Quality criteria were
developed based on recommendations made by the Cochrane
Collaboration (2011), and included: psychophysiological mea-
surements used, clarity of measurements taken, psychophysio-
logical methodology and procedure used, aSCR measurements
taken, feedback SCR measurements taken, IGT methodology
followed, description of the study that allows replication, clear
1 Note that our additional search identified four studies that could be included
in the systematic review. The authors of two studies did not respond to our
request for data clarification (Akiyama & Hasegawa, 2014; Sandor & Gurvit,
2019).
Fig. 1 PRISMA diagram. Overview of search process, identification of studies and data extraction
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aims, appropriate analysis used, prospective power analysis,
effect sizes used, information related to participants’ demo-
graphics, inclusion/exclusion criteria included, outcomes pro-
vided, and details of timing of measures. A score of 0–2 was
awarded for each element (0= no details, 1= insufficient details,
2= complete details) and these were summed to give a total (0–
18) (Cochrane Collaboration, 2011).
Data extraction and synthesis
Data were extracted using a standardized extraction sheet by
BS. The extraction sheet included: identifying information
(e.g. type of study, source references and research questions);
inclusion criteria (e.g. healthy, normal participants
performing IGT while physiological measurements were tak-
en) and exclusion criteria (e.g. patient population, evaluation
of behavioural tests of awareness, absence of physiological
measurements and different gambling tasks); study details
(e.g. type of IGT and IGT procedure, number of participants
and participants’ details such as age and ethnicity); physiolog-
ical measurements (e.g. types and details of measurements);
results (e.g. statistical techniques used, p values and effect
sizes); comments on the paper (e.g. the authors comments,
reviewers comments and suitability for inclusion). A second
(DS) and a third reviewer (ES) independently reviewed ex-
tracted data to ensure accuracy and reliability, with reviewers
meeting to confirm agreement of extraction and to establish
reliability. Where there were discrepancies, these were re-
solved by discussion. Twenty published research studies were
included in the review and evaluated for the purposes of this
review. The reported studies had similar aims and utilized
similar psychophysiological measurements. Nineteen studies
measured skin conductance response activity (SCR), and one
study measured both SCR and heart-rate variability (HRV).
No study specifically measured only heart rate (HR) and HRV
in relation to IGT performance.
Results
Participants
The 20 included studies recruited 1,364 healthy, normal par-
ticipants in total. The age of participants ranged from 17 years
(Carter & Smith-Pasqualini, 2004) to 85 years old (Denburg,
Recknor, Bechara, & Tranel, 2006). Four studies did not re-
port the age of participants (Guillaume et al., 2009; Visagan,
Xiang, & Lamar 2012; Wagar & Dixon, 2006, 2006a). Five
studies were conducted in the UK (Carter & Smith-Pasqualini,
2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Jenkinson, Baker, Edelstyn, &
Ellis, 2008; Visagan et al., 2012; Wright, Rakow, & Russo,
2017), six were conducted in the USA (Denburg et al., 2006;
Hinson, Whitney, Holben, & Wirick, 2006, 2006a, 2006b;
Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002, 2002a), two were con-
ducted in Canada (Wagar & Dixon, 2006, 2006a) and one
each was conducted in Germany (Werner, Duschek, &
Schandry, 2009), Japan (Suzuki et al., 2003), Belgium
(Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012), Taiwan (Yen, Chou, Chung,
& Chen, 2012), France (Guillaume et al., 2009), Romania
(Miu, Crisan, Chis, Ungureanu, Druga, & Vulturar, 2012)
and Italy (Ottaviani & Vandone, 2014). The prevalence of
female participants ranged from 30% (Suzuki et al., 2003) to
100% (Carter & Smith-Pasqualini, 2004); three studies did not
report gender (Wagar & Dixon, 2006, 2006a; Yen et al.,
2012). Only six studies included inclusion/exclusion criteria
for study participation (Carter & Smith-Pasqualini, 2004;
Denburg et al., 2006; Guillaume et al., 2009; Jenkinson
et al., 2008; Werner et al., 2009; Visagan et al., 2012).
Quality assessment of included studies
The study quality criteria were based on the total quality score
derived from the quality criteria developed from the Cochrane
Collaboration (2011) review. The overall quality of the studies
was good (Table 1). There were procedural and methodolog-
ical differences between studies and no study provided infor-
mation about statistical power to detect effects. Twelve studies
did not report demographic information about their partici-
pants (Guillaume et al., 2009; Hinson et al., 2006, 2006a,
2006b; Hinson et al., 2002, 2002a; Miu et al., 2012; Suzuki
et al., 2003; Visagan et al., 2012; Wagar & Dixon, 2006,
2006a; Yen et al., 2012). Seven studies did not measure feed-
back SCR (Hinson et al., 2006, 2006a, 2006b; Hinson et al.,
2002, 2002a; Denburg et al., 2006; Yen et al., 2012).
Four studies reported using a standardised protocol for
measuring SCR (Denburg et al., 2006; Fernie & Tunney,
2013; Visagan et al., 2012; Werner et al., 2009). Nine studies
stated they ensured IGT protocol and procedures were follow-
ed (Carter & Smith-Pasqualini, 2004; Denburg et al., 2006;
Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Guillaume et al., 2009; Jenkinson
et al., 2008; Visagan et al., 2012; Wagar & Dixon, 2006,
2006a;Werner et al., 2009). Ten studies either used a modified
version of the IGT or did not provide sufficient details of the
IGT protocol (Hinson et al., 2002, 2002a; Hinson et al., 2006,
2006a, 2006b; Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; Miu et al., 2012;
Suzuki et al., 2003;Wright et al., 2017; Yen et al., 2012). Only
two studies reported effect sizes (Mardaga &Hansenne, 2012;
Miu et al., 2012)2.
2 The studies were numbered as follow: (1) Carter & Smith-Pasqualini (2004);
(2) Denburg et al. (2006); (3) Fernie & Tunney (2013); (4) Guillaume et al.
(2009); (5) Hinson et al. (2002); (6) Hinson et al. (2002a); (7) Hinson et al.
(2006); (8) Hinson et al. (2006a); (9) Hinson et al. (2006b); (10) Jenkinson
et al. (2008); (11) Mardaga & Hansenne (2012); (12) Miu et al. (2012); (13)
Ottaviani & Vandone (2015); (14) Suzuki et al. (2003); (15) Visagan et al.
(2012); (16) Wagar & Dixon (2006); (17) Wagar & Dixon (2006a); (18)
Werner et al. (2009); (19) Yen et al. (2012); (20) Wright, Rakow & Russo
(2017).
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Method and findings
The studies used similar statistical methods to assess the re-
search questions (e.g. ANOVA, ANCOVA and t-test), which
were ascertained to be suitable for the study designed. The
results are summarised in Table 2. One study used the
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (Denburg et al., 2006). Several
studies’ results were associated with higher aSCRs with picks
from disadvantageous decks (Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012;
Guillaume et al., 2009; Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Yen et al.,
2012). One of the studies reported a borderline association
(Jenkinson et al., 2008), one reported no association
(Denburg et al., 2006) and six studies did not separately report
aSCRs for disadvantageous and advantageous decks.
Significant interactions were found between aSCR amplitude
and IGT performance in six studies (Carter & Smith-
Pasqualini, 2004; Guillaume et al., 2009; Mardaga &
Hansenne, 2012; Miu et al., 2012; Wagar & Dixon, 2006,
2006a), while one study found no interaction (Fernie &
Tunney, 2013). One study associated aSCRs with picks from
advantageous decks but not disadvantageous decks (Denburg
et al., 2006). High SCR responses were evident in one study
after encountering feedback from a punishment/reward se-
quence (Suzuki et al., 2003). Results from two studies sug-
gested an interdependency between conscious knowledge and
the appearance of somatic markers (Guillaume et al., 2009;
Hinson et al., 2002). However, Hinson et al. argued that con-
scious knowledge suppresses the development of somatic
markers, while in Guillaume et al.’s study performance corre-
lated with both aSCRs and conscious knowledge. One study
found that aSCR is not necessary to succeed on IGT: in the
absence of a significant SCR, participants still learnt and se-
lected advantageously (Fernie & Tunney, 2013). Hinson et al.
(2006) showed that pre-experimental emotion-laden words
briefly held in working memory influence deck choices:
Participant choices were facilitated by the pre-existing affec-
tive reaction, whereby a positive affective load enhanced qual-
ity of decision making, and negative load reduced the quality.
Finally, one study found no direct relationship between the
SCR and IGT performance (Visagan et al., 2012). Their post
hoc analysis, however, revealed that the SCR parameters were
significantly related to threat anxiety and emotion regulation,
which were in turn associated with IGT performance.
There were differences in timing and quantification of SCR
peak amplitudes: 11 studies defined anticipatory responses
within a 5-s window before deck selection (Fernie &
Tunney, 2013; Guillaume et al., 2009; Hinson et al., 2006;
Hinson et al., 2006a; Hinson et al., 2006b; Jenkinson et al.,
2008; Miu et al., 2012; Visagan et al., 2012; Wagar & Dixon,
2006; Wagar & Dixon, 2006a; Yen et al., 2012). Three studies
used 5-s aSCR and 10-s feedback SCR for defining responses
(Hinson et al., 2002; Hinson et al., 2002a; Mardaga &
Hansenne, 2012). Three studies defined SCR responses within
1–7 s (Werner et al., 2009), 1–9 s (Carter & Smith-Pasqualini,
2004) and 10 s (Suzuki et al., 2003) before and after the par-
ticipants chose a deck. Fourteen studies quantified SCR peak
as a mean response within their proposed time frame and then
averagedmean amplitudes across 100 trials (Fernie & Tunney,
2013; Guillaume et al., 2009; Hinson et al., 2002; Hinson
et al., 2002a; Hinson et al., 2006; Hinson et al., 2006a;
Hinson et al., 2006b; Jenkinson et al., 2008; Mardaga &
Hansenne, 2012; Miu et al., 2012; Yen et al., 2012; Wagar
& Dixon, 2006; Wagar & Dixon, 2006a; Werner et al.,
2009). In contrast, three studies calculated the largest SCR
amplitude or the first SCR peak amplitude and designated
the responses as aSCR or feedback SCR (Carter & Smith-
Pasqualini, 2004; Suzuki et al., 2003; Visagan et al., 2012).
Fourteen out of the 15 studies that are included in first
meta-analysis calculated a beneficial autonomic response by
subtracting aSCR scores for advantageous decks (C+D) from
Table 1 Quality assessment of included studies
Quality criteria Scores
Study references 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Participant’s details 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
Inclusion/exclusion criteria 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
IGT procedure 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
Psychophysiology procedure 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
Exact statistic reported 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Effect size 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Power analysis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reliable measure of outcome 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Details of timing of measures 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total score/20 14 14 13 13 11 11 10 10 10 12 14 13 16 10 14 12 12 13 10 14
0= no details, 1= insufficient details, 2= complete details
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Table 2 Characteristics of included studies (N=20)
Study ID and
reference
Participants’
demographics
Type of IGT Psychophysiological measurements Outcome
(1) Carter &
Smith-Pasqua-
lini (2004) UK
30 healthy women, aged
17–53 y (mean =
29.7, SD = 8.39)
Bechara et al. (1994). Two
conditions: fake vs. real
money
Performance and anticipatory SCR
interaction (IGT scores as DV);
SCR and learning rate per block
Correlation between aSCR and
money won on IGT **
(2) Denburg et al.
(2006) USA
80 healthy, older adults,
aged 56– 85 y. 40
participants sampled
from the previous
study
Bechara et al. (2000)*3 SCR anticipative advantageousness
in two different groups
Effect of aSCR for
disadvantageous decks in one
group ***
(3) Fernie &
Tunney (2013)
UK
32 post-graduate
students, 16 males
(mean age 25.68 y,
SD = 1.22)
Bechara et al. (1994)*.
Knowledge probed (Maia
& McClelland 2004)
SCR anticipative response amplitude
(effect of decks); SCR-awareness
interaction
No effect of aSCR on IGT. Effect
of knowledge of the task
contingencies **4, ***5
(4) Guillaume
et al. (2009)
France
30 participants (11
male)
Bechara et al. (1994)*.
Knowledge probed (Maia
& McClelland 2004)
Anticipatory SCR; Performance and
beneficial SCR interaction (IGT
scores as DV)
Effect of aSCR for
disadvantageous deck
selection **, ***
(5) Hinson et al.
(2002) USA
Study 2: 45 students,
aged 18–24 y. 58%
female
Bechara et al. (1994)*.
Overall payoffs are less
extreme
Anticipatory SCR; SCR amplitude as
DV
aSCRs predicted IGT
performance **
(6) Hinson et al.
(2002a) USA
Study 3: 47 students,
aged 18–24 y. 58%
female
Bechara et al. (1994)*.
Overall payoffs are less
extreme
Anticipatory SCR; SCR amplitude as
DV
No effect of aSCR. Working
memory connected to the
development of somatic
markers **
(7) Hinson et al.
(2006) USA
Study 1: 70 students,
aged 18–25 y. 60%
female
Bechara et al. (1994)*.
Affective reaction
manipulated
SCR and learning rate per block.
Positive and negative (emotionally
charged) word load was used and
related to learning rate per block
Effect of aSCRs for advantageous
decks. SCR amplitude
appeared after IGT
performance was already well
established **
(8) Hinson et al.
(2006a) USA
Study 2: 40 students,
aged 18–25 y. 55%
female
Bechara et al. (1994)*.
Affective reaction
manipulated
SCR and learning rate per block.
Positive and negative (emotionally
charged) word load was used and
related to learning rate per block
Effect of aSCRs for advantageous
decks **
(9) Hinson et al.
(2006b) USA
Study 3: 70 students,
aged 18–25 y. 60%
female
Bechara et al. (1994)*.
Affective reaction
manipulated
SCR and learning rate per block.
Positive and negative (emotionally
charged) word load was used and
related to learning rate per block
Effect of feedback SCR (post
deck selection). SCR effect on
IGT score but not a major
factor **
(10) Jenkinson
et al. (2008)
UK
41 healthy individuals
aged 18–28 y (M =
20.5, SD = 2.8; 11
male, 30 female)
Bechara et al. (1994)*. Real
and fake money versions
Anticipatory and appraisal SCR;
Performance and beneficial SCR
interaction (IGT scores as DV)
The borderline significant effect
for aSCR rises preceding
disadvantageous decks
selections ***
(11) Mardaga &
Hansenne
(2012)
Belgium
32 healthy participants
(10 men) aged 19–34
y (mean = 22.9, SD =
4.03) students
Bechara et al. (1994)*. Gains
and losses presented
sequentially, as opposed to
the original parallel
presentation
Anticipatory and Appraisal SCR;
SCR amplitude; Performance and
beneficial SCR interaction (IGT
scores as DV)
Effect of aSCR for
disadvantageous decks
selection **
(12) Miu et al.
(2012)
Romania
135 students, (118
women) aged 16-42
y, (M= 21.6)
Bechara et al. (1994)* SCR anticipative response amplitude;
Performance and beneficial SCR
interaction (IGT scores as DV)
Effect of aSCR. SCR mediated
IGT performance **
(13) Ottaaviani &
Vandone
(2015) Italy
445 healthy participants
(348 men, 97
women) employed in
management
societies
Bechara et al. (1994)* Anticipatory and Appraisal SCR;
SCR amplitude for
disadvantageous decks6
No effect of aSCR on IGT **.
Effect of aSCR for
disadvantageous decks ***
(14) Suzuki et al.
(2003) Japan
40 students, (27 men
and 13 women) aged
18–23 y, (M= 19.9,
SD= 1.29)
Bechara et al. (1994)* Anticipatory and appraisal SCR No effect of aSCR. Effect of
feedback SCR (post deck
selection) **, ***
(15) Visagan
et al. (2012)
UK
33 students, (15 men, 18
women) aged 20–40
Bechara et al. (1997)* Anticipatory SCR; SCR and learning
rate per block
No effect of aSCR ***
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aSCR scores for disadvantageous decks (A+B) that was cor-
related with IGT performance ([1] Carter & Smith-Pasqualini
2004; [4] Guillaume et al., 2009; [5] Hinson et al., 2002; [6]
Hinson et al.,2002a; [7] Hinson et al., 2006; [8] Hinson et al.,
2006a; [9] Hinson et al., 2006b; [11] Mardaga & Hansenne,
2012; [12]Miu et al., 2012; [13] Ottaaviani & Vandone, 2015;
[14] Suzuki et al., 2003; [16] Wagar & Dixon, 2006; [17]
Wagar & Dixon, 2006a; [18] Werner et al., 2009) and one
study calculated aSCR responses separately for advantageous
and disadvantageous decks ([20] Wright et al., 2017). Eight
studies, which are included in second meta-analysis, exam-
ined differences in aSCR scores before the advantageous picks
(C+ D) and the disadvantageous picks (A + B) ([3] Fernie &
Tunney, 2013; [4] Guillaume et al., 2009; [10] Jenkinson
et al., 2009; [13] Ottaaviani & Vandone, 2015; [14] Suzuki
et al., 2003; [16] Wagar & Dixon, 2006; [17] Wagar & Dixon,
2006a; [20] Wright et al., 2017).
Meta-analyses
All analyses were performed using Meta-Essentials
(Suurmond, van Rhee, & Hak, 2017). The meta-analysis cal-
culator was used to compute R statistics (Lyons, 2004). Three
studies were excluded, one based on the consistency of IGT
and SCR methods (Yen et al., 2012) and two because of
insufficient data (Denburg et al., 2006; Visagan et al.,
20125). Seventeen studies were included in the meta-analysis.
Two separate meta-analyses were performed testing
Hypothesis 1 (the relationship between overall aSCR and
IGT performance; k=15) and Hypothesis 2 (greater aSCR
for bad decks compared to good decks; k=8). In addition,
the total risk of bias score was used as a potential moderator
in the meta-analysis.
Anticipatory SCR and IGT performance
First, analyses were conducted and effect sizes calculated for
each study (Table 3). Specifically, we calculated r and confi-
dence interval (CI; upper and lower) for studies that tested an
effect of aSCRs in relation to IGT performance. Then a com-
bined effect size was calculated and examined by using a
Forest plot (Fig. 2). The Forest plot revealed a combined effect
size of r = 0.22 (CI 0.17–0.27, p<0.00001) representing a
small to medium relationship between aSCR and IGT perfor-
mance (Table 4) such that SCR before deck picks correlated
positively with the proportion of good deck selections. The
overall effect size was also homogenous, Q (15) = 11.04,
p<.0001; I2 = 0.00, indicating that there was no heterogeneity
issue. Publication bias analyses were undertaken by calculat-
ing fail-safe N (Rosenthal, 1979). Moreover, study quality
Table 2 (continued)
Study ID and
reference
Participants’
demographics
Type of IGT Psychophysiological measurements Outcome
y, (M= 22.2, SD=
3.7)
(16) Wagar &
Dixon (2006)
Canada
12 undergraduate
students
Bechara et al. (1994)* SCR anticipative
disadvantageousness;
Performance and anticipatory SCR
interaction (IGT scores as DV)
Effect of aSCR for
disadvantageous decks **, ***
(17) Wagar &
Dixon (2006a)
Canada
12 undergraduate
students.
Bechara et al. (1994)* SCR anticipative
disadvantageousness;
Performance and beneficial SCR
interaction (IGT scores as DV)
Effect of aSCR for
disadvantageous decks **, ***
(18) Werner et al.
(2009)
Germany
64 students, (32 men, 32
women)
Bechara et al. (1994)* SCR and HR anticipative response
amplitude; SCR and HR appraisal
response amplitude
No correlation between aSCR
and IGT **
(19) Yen et al.
(2012) Taiwan
34 undergraduate
students (11 males,
23 females), aged
20–31 y
Bechara et al. (1999)* SCR anticipative
disadvantageousness (interaction
with expected risk; intuition and
conceptual phases)
Effect of aSCR and deck choices
(20) Wright et al.
(2017) UK
72 undergraduate
students (18 males,
54 females), aged
18–21 y
Bechara et al. (1999)* Anticipatory and appraisal SCR;
SCR amplitude for advantageous
and disadvantageous decks
Effect of aSCR and deck choices
** No effect of aSCR for
disadvantageous decks ***
3Note all * are the computerised version
4Note all ** Testing hypothesis 1 (relationship between overall aSCR and IGT performance)
5 Note all *** Testing hypothesis 2 (differences between good and bad decks
6 The authors recorded anticipatory SCRs before the disadvantageous decks during the first 40 and the last 60 trials. They provided the data that were
calculated to suit our analyses and our hypotheses.
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was not a significant moderator (z = 0.93, p=0.35). The fail-
safe N was 247, suggesting that even if a greater number of
additional relevant studies with null results were included, the
overall effect size would remain significant. However, be-
cause fail-safe N is biased towards overestimating the number
of null studies required to render the overall effect size
nonsignificant (Carson, Schriesheim, & Kinicki, 1990), a fun-
nel plot of the standard error by the standard mean differences
was generated (Fig. 3). The distribution was symmetrical, fur-
ther suggesting no issues regarding publication bias.
Differences in anticipatory SCR
between disadvantageous and advantageous decks
First, effect sizes were calculated for each study (Table 5).
Specifically, we calculated r and CI (upper and lower) for
studies that found an effect of anticipatory SCRs in relation
to disadvantageous deck picks. Then a combined effect size
was calculated and examined using a Forest plot (Fig. 4). The
aSCR before the disadvantageous deck picks were higher than
before the advantageous deck picks. The Forest plot revealed
a combined effect size of r = 0.10 (CI 0.04–0.16, p=0.005)
representing a small effect (Table 6). The overall effect size
was not homogenous, Q (8) = 16.15, p=.005; I2 = 0.03, indi-
cating low homogeneity. Indeed, inspection revealed two
studies, both authored by Wagar and Dixon (2006, 2006a),
found medium to large difference, whereas the other six stud-
ies found either small differences (Guillaume et al., 2009;
Ottaaviani & Vandone 2015) or no differences (Fernie &
Tunney, 2013; Jenkinson et al., 2009; Suzuki et al., 2003;
Wright et al., 2017). However, study quality was not a signif-
icant moderator (z = -0.92, p=0.36). Publication bias analyses
were undertaken first by calculating fail-safe N (Rosenthal,
1979). The fail-safe N was 26, suggesting that if a relatively
Fig. 2 Forest plot. Combined effect size confidence intervals of studies correlating aSCR and successful IGT performance
Table 3 Effect sizes of studies included in the meta-analysis related to
aSCR correlates with successful IGT performance
Study N R 95% CI Weight
Carter & Smith-Pasqualini (2004) 30 .49* .14, .73 2.45%
Guillaume et al. (2009) 30 .38* .01, .66 2.45%
Hinson et al. (2002)† 45 .10* -.21, .39 3.81%
Hinson et al. (2002a) † 47 .07* -.23, .36 3.99%
Hinson et al. (2006) † 70 .15* -.09, .38 6.08%
Hinson et al. (2006a) † 40 .19* -.14, .48 3.36%
Hinson et al. (2006b) † 70 .16* -.08, .38 6.08%
Mardaga & Hansenne (2012) 32 .30* -.07, .60 2.63%
Miu et al. (2012) 135 .29* .13, .44 11.98%
Ottaaviani & Vandone (2015) † 445 .21 .12, .30 40.11%
Suzuki et al. (2003) 40 .00 -.32, .32 3.36%
Wagar & Dixon (2006) 12 .40* -.30, .82 0.82%
Wagar & Dixon (2006a) 12 .60* -.04, .89 0.82%
Werner, Duschec & Schandry (2009) 64 .25 .00, .47 5.54%
Wright et al. (2017) 72 .23* .00, .44 6.53%
*All p values significant at .05
†All effect sizes provided by the author
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small number of additional relevant studies with null results
were included, the overall effect size would not remain signif-
icant. However, because fail-safe N is biased towards
overestimating the number of null studies required to render
the overall effect size nonsignificant (Carson et al., 1990), a
funnel plot of the standard error by the standard mean differ-
ences was generated (Fig. 5). The distribution is not symmet-
rical, confirming issues regarding publication bias.
Discussion
This systematic review identified 20 studies measuring aSCR
to IGT in healthy populations. All of the studies included in
the systematic review used aSCR measurements and predom-
inantly Bechara et al.’s (1994) original IGT. Seventeen studies
were included in two meta-analyses testing the overall aSCR
effect on IGT performance differences, and aSCR responses
between the good and the bad deck picks. The first meta-
analysis revealed a small to medium significant relationship
between aSCR and the proportion of good deck selections.
The results provide support for the SMH; however, the effect
size indicated that other factors are important during decision
making. The second meta-analysis revealed a small, signifi-
cant effect of aSCR between the bad and the good deck picks.
However, the overall effect size was not homogenous, and the
distribution was not symmetrical, indicating that there is no
clear aSCR distinction between the bad and the good decks
because of heterogeneity and possible publication bias.
Meta-analysis 1: The relationship between overall
aSCR and IGT performance
The results from the first meta-analysis indicate that overall
aSCR correlates with successful performance on the IGT
(Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Guillaume et al., 2009; Mardaga
& Hansenne, 2012; Miu et al., 2012; Wagar & Dixon, 2006;
Werner et al., 2009). However, only four studies reported me-
dium and large effect sizes (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004;
Guillaume et al., 2009; Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Wagar &
Dixon, 2006a), whereas eight out of the remaining 11 studies
found small, significant differences. It is notable that the four
studies reporting medium and large effect sizes had small
sample sizes; however, the quality rating of the studies was
good and unrelated to effect size; they reported psychophysi-
ological and IGT procedures in good detail. Conversely, six
out of the other eleven studies scored slightly lower on the
quality assessment with few points lost on the clarity of phys-
iological and IGT procedures. For example, they did not re-
port procedures of adapted IGTs in good detail (Hinson et al.,
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Fig. 3 Funnel plot of standard error by effect size for studies correlating aSCR and successful IGT performance
Table 4 Summary of meta-analysis related to aSCR correlates with successful IGT performance
All studies K N Combined effect 95% Combined z Combined I2
size (r) CI p
Homogeneous 15 1,147 .22 .17 to .27 7.40 p< .0001 .00
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2002, 2002a; Hinson et al., 2006, 2006a, 2006b; Suzuki et al.,
2003); and/or did not report the exact physiological proce-
dures (Hinson et al., 2006; Hinson et al., 2006a; Hinson
et al., 2006b; Suzuki et al., 2003). Thus, methodological dif-
ferences may account for the differing strength of the findings,
whereas overall quality did not.
While there is agreement that there is a correlation between
the strength of overall aSCR signals and IGT performance, it
is difficult to differentiate what aSCRs for bad and good decks
represent. Dunn et al.’s (2006) review pointed out that the
aSCR signal may be “a response to feedback, an indicator of
risk, a marker of post-decision emotion state, or a signal of
how good or bad a particular response option is” (p. 251).
Furthermore, the absence of the aSCRs signals can lead to a
good IGT performance, and aSCR activity is not necessary to
succeed on the IGT (Fernie & Tunney, 2013). Fernie and
Tunney (2013) showed that the participants learn to select
advantageously on the IGTand develop knowledge of the task
contingencies sufficient to guide behaviour after approximate-
ly 40 trials without developing a SCR. Furthermore, the post-
knowledge difference in feedback SCRs indicates that the
choices could have been made based on conscious knowl-
edge. This is in line with the suggestion that performance on
IGT may be guided by two pathways: aSCRs may represent
somatic markers that guide successful decision making during
the IGT (Bechara et al., 1996), or aSCRs represent a proxy of
good performance and are caused by conscious knowledge
(e.g. Guillaume et al., 2009; Maia & McClelland, 2004;
Wagar & Dixon, 2006). This indicates a complex interplay
between the emotion-based signals and conscious knowledge
during the task, and the relatively slow time course of aSCR
signals make it difficult to separate the different influences on
aSCR signal. Hence, unless participants are having differential
aSCRs to good and bad choices, it is questionable if a magni-
tude of an absolute somatic marker guides decision making
(e.g. Maia & McClelland, 2004).
Meta-analysis 2: Differences between aSCR for good
and bad decks
The results from the second meta-analysis of eight studies
indicate that there is a difference in aSCRs between disadvan-
tageous and advantageous deck selection: aSCR is elevated
for disadvantageous decks compared to advantageous decks.
However, that difference is small and due to heterogeneity in
the findings the results may be misleading, such that: (a) some
of the studies in the meta-analysis overestimated the true effect
size because they are based on a biased sample or a small
sample size (e.g. Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider, & Minder
1997); and/or (b) there could be a number of studies missing
(published/unpublished). Indeed, two smaller studies (Wagar
& Dixon, 2006, 2006a) found medium to large differences,
two larger studies found small differences (Guillaume et al.,
2009; Ottaaviani & Vandone, 2015), and four studies found
small, non-significant differences; there are no other clear
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Fig. 4 Forest plot. Combined effect size confidence interval related to aSCR differences between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks
Table 5 Effect sizes of included studies related to aSCR differences
between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks
Study N R 95% CI Weight
Fernie & Tunney (2013) 32 -.06 -.41, .31 4.43%
Guillaume et al. (2009) 30 .05* -.36, .36 4.13%
Jenkinson et al. (2009) 32 .22 -.15, .54 4.43%
Ottaaviani & Vandone (2015) † 445 .09* .00, .18 67.58%
Suzuki et al. (2003) 40 .12 -.15, .54 5.66%
Wagar & Dixon (2006) 12 .73* .19, .93 1.38%
Wagar & Dixon (2006a) 12 .77* .28, .94 1.38%
Wright et al. (2017) 72 .02 -.25, .21 11.01%
*All p values significant at .05
†All effect sizes provided by the author
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methodological differences that may account for their differ-
ent findings. Indeed, the quality rating of the studies was good
and was unrelated to effect size; studies reported psychophys-
iological and IGT procedures in good detail. It may be that
aSCR measurements do not differentiate between the positive
and negative aSCRs, and so these studies cannot provide de-
finitive data about the valence of the aSCR signals. This is in
accordance with the argument that SCR is influenced by the
activation of the neuropsychological, behavioural, inhibitory
system implicated in responses to punishment and frustration
from a lack of reward. It is therefore difficult to interpret SCR
as being based on negative outcomes alone (e.g. Fowles,
1988).
It should be noted that some studies reported aSCR differ-
ences in response to disadvantageous deck selection but not
advantageous deck selection (e.g. Guillaume et al., 2009;
Ottaaviani & Vandone, 2015; Wagar & Dixon 2006). This is
consistent with Damasio’s (1994) original proposition that
aSCRs for disadvantageous decks lead to a shift in preference
from bad to good decks. However, there was evidence of a
correlation between the aSCR related to the advantageous
deck selection and successful performance on the task (e.g.
Denburg et al., 2006, Hinson et al., 2006). This raises the
possibility that it is not the intensity of aSCRs signals before
the bad decks that is important, but the contrast between aSCR
signals before good versus bad decks (e.g. Guillaume et al.,
2009). However, further studies are needed to resolve this
issue. Interestingly, only eight out of 20 studies examined
aSCR differences between the good and the bad decks.
Considering that the key argument in support of the SMH
emphasises the importance of anticipatory changes related to
the disadvantageous decks in learning IGT, we would encour-
age researchers to examine this effect in more detail.
The interpretation of our results may be complicated by a
number of factors. Differences in aSCRs between decks found
on the IGT may be confounded by expectancies about reward
and punishments after a deck has been chosen rather than an
anticipatory signal indicating deck quality (e.g. Hinson et al.,
2006, 2006a; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). This raises the possibil-
ity that anticipatory somatic markers reflect the outcome of a
decision process and serve to ready the subject for new infor-
mation when making an uncertain response,
or, alternatively, are driven by the risk or punishment pre-
sentation associated with a specific deck (e.g. Davis, Love, &
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Fig. 5 Funnel plot of standard error by effect size for studies correlating aSCR differences between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks
Table 6 Summary of meta-analysis related to aSCR differences between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks
All studies K N Combined effect 95% Combined z Combined I2
size (r) CI p
Homogeneous 8 678 .10 .04 to .16 2.60 p= .005 .03
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Maddox, 2009; Suzuki et al., 2003). Suzuki et al. (2003) sug-
gested that feedback SCR, rather than aSCR of deck selection,
is more important for mediating IGT performance. This feed-
back response was related to punishment encountered when
choosing from the disadvantageous decks (Suzuki et al.,
2003). This is in line with a view that anticipatory markers
reflect the outcome of a decision involving a significant or
uncertain choice (Davis et al., 2009). Indeed, if stronger feed-
back SCR follows selections from disadvantageous decks
(Jenkinson et al., 2008) and frequent punishments from both
decks (Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012), then there is a possibility
that somatic markers arise for the outcome of deck choices
(Davis et al., 2009). This is important since these results relate
optimal performance on the IGT to participants’ expectation
of punishments and rewards only after a deck has been select-
ed. Furthermore, this also challenges the SMH view that an-
ticipatory somatic markers serve as inputs to the decision pro-
cess and code the value or risk associated with each deck.
In summary, the results from both meta-analyses suggest
that aSCR is a somatic marker in IGTstudies. Nonetheless, we
cannot exclude the possibility that somatic markers can be
imperfectly represented by SCR. The somatic markers may
represent an anticipated, affective reaction before the choice
had been made; however, they may also represent an affective
reaction after the choice had beenmade and when a person has
enough knowledge of the task to predict a choice. Thus, the
somatic marker may be a correlate of good performance rather
than a cause of it.
Methodological and measurement issues
Our review indicates that there may be an issue when
quantifying aSCR and feedback SCR measurements.
Levinson, Edelberg, and Bridger (1984) suggest that
any SCR that begins between 1 and 3 s following
stimulus onset may be elicited by the stimulus. This
latency effect is followed by SCR rise and recovery
time. One issue when quantifying aSCRs is whether a
response is elicited prior to recovery from a preceding
response. Thus, the amplitude of the second response
may be distorted by being superimposed on the
recovery of the first response. This makes interpreting
aSCR and feedback SCR difficult, and emphasizes the
utility of logarithmic data transformation to remedy this
issue and/or the need for sufficient latency between tri-
als to avoid response distortion. Indeed, Lykken and
Venables (1971) proposed standardised techniques for
SCR measurement where the correction procedure (e.g.
computing the logarithm of SCR) can significantly re-
duce errors in measurements. Although most studies
reviewed here have logarithmically transformed the
aSCR amplitude to fit normal distribution, it is notice-
able that the aSCR response time, included in the
logarithmic transformation, differs between the studies;
for example, Mardaga and Hansenne (2012) used 5-s
aSCR and 10-s feedback SCR for defining responses,
whereas Werner et al. (2009) defined aSCR responses
within 1–7 s, and this may have generated some mea-
surement errors. Furthermore, it has been noticed that
variations in room temperature and handwashing with
soap and water may create errors in SCR measurements
(Venables & Christie, 1973). Venables and Christie
(1973) recommended handwashing with nonabrasive
soap before having the electrodes attached and a con-
stant room temperature of 23°C. However, only two
studies reported that they had controlled room tempera-
ture (Guillaume et al., 2009; Mardaga & Hansenne,
2012) and none of the studies reported participants hand
washing with nonabrasive soap. Accordingly, the meta-
analysis may underestimate the relationship between
aSCR and IGT performance.
Themeasurement choice of SCR in the studies in this meta-
analysis as an indicator of somatic markers might in itself be
problematic. This is because SCR might not involve regula-
tion by the autonomic nervous system, but rather represent
regulation by the brain stem and hypothalamus. A better mea-
sure for sustained tonic levels of tension may be skin-
conductance level, which measures sweat gland activity in
response to events, but not the SCRs, which measure transient
responses (e.g. Marr, 2011). Tonic levels of muscular tension
produced under continuous choice alternatives are generally
known to modulate avoidance behaviours, and SCR has been
found to be an effective predictor of rejecting unpleasant and
psychologically distressing behavioural options (van‘t Wout,
Kahn, Sanfey, and Aleman, 2006).
The quality of studies included in the review was good but
is not without limitation. There were some procedural and
methodological differences between studies. For example,
some studies reported using a standardised protocol for mea-
suring SCR (Denburg et al., 2006; Fernie & Tunney, 2013;
Werner et al., 2009; Visagan et al., 2012), whereas most of the
studies did not provide sufficient details of the protocol to
allow replication. Furthermore, several studies calculated a
beneficial autonomic response where the summed aSCR
scores for advantageous decks (C+D) were subtracted from
scores on disadvantageous decks (A+B), to calculate absolute
aSCRs (Guillaume et al., 2009; Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012;
Miu et al., 2012). This might create an issue when interpreting
somatic markers because an absolute aSCR may be subject to
many superfluous influences that have nothing to do with
discrimination of choice outcomes in the IGT (e.g. Dawson,
Schell, & Filion, 2000). For example, the absolute magnitude
of aSCR choices may depend on the features of the payoff
schedules, and not the category of good or bad choice per se
(e.g. Hinson et al., 2002). Thus, it is difficult to fully assess the
quality of all included studies and to account for potential
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biases that result from different protocol and/or outcome mea-
sures used, which might impact on the conclusions drawn.
Future research
Further investigation of somatic markers and the associated
brain structures that represent the state of the body is warrant-
ed, especially the right-hemisphere insula. A meta-analysis of
neuroimaging studies of the IGT may also be prudent.
Clarification is also needed about the role of aSCRs when
there are differing levels of knowledge (e.g. low uncertainty
associated with risk vs. high uncertainty associated with am-
biguity). Heightened arousal can have an adaptive role when
there is sufficient knowledge about the outcomes (de Berker
et al., 2015; FeldmanHall, Glimcher, Baker, & Phelps, 2016),
and therefore stronger aSCR signals should be related to the
later stages of the IGT contrary to the SMH prediction. This
raises the possibility that aSCRs during the initial stage of the
IGT reflect some aspects of cognitive processes rather than
high uncertainty associated with ambiguity. This accords with
the view that arousal that accompanies choice under uncer-
tainty develops through a ‘cognitive’ assessment of the chosen
action and its consequences (Otto, Knox, Markman, & Love,
2014).
Future research should consider using measures that afford
greater precision, including heart rate and blood pressure with
an electrocardiogram (e.g. Crone et al., 2004) or pupil dilation.
This is important because the aSCR signal during the IGT
performance may be part of a broader response including at-
tentional bias and implicit learning (e.g. Turnbull, Bowman,
Shanker, & Davies, 2014) that can be measured by eye track-
ing. For instance, Bierman, Cleeremans, Ditzhuyzen, and van
Gaal (2004) used the eye-tracking methodology to explicate
the processes involved in the development of somatic
markers. Furthermore, anticipatory pupil dilations may predict
IGT performance (Simonovic et al., 2017b) and may be used
as a marker of noradrenaline activity, which has been associ-
ated with reward prediction errors (Lavin, San Martin, &
Jubal, 2014). These studies suggest that somatic marker activ-
ity could be extended to other domains of arousal that might
provide a better assessment of the SMH.
Conclusion
This review provides some evidence in support of the SMH
with significant, small-to-medium correlations between the
aSCR and IGT performance and a small difference in aSCR
between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks. The
quality of the evidence is good overall. However, there is a
possibility that measures of skin conductance only provide a
limited insight regarding how optimal deck selection is guided
by somatic markers. For studies to be replicable, they need to
report procedures and details of either original IGT or modi-
fied IGT tasks to reduce sources of heterogeneity and enable
more robust conclusions. Hence, to conclusively demonstrate
implicit learning through somatic markers, studies should be
consistent in reporting the standardised protocols, methodol-
ogies and measures. We would encourage researchers to not
only extend IGT tasks but to replicate findings with previous
versions of the IGT and equivalent protocols.
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